Uncertainty and Heterogeneity in Returns to Education: Evidence from Finland by Kässi, Otto
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Uncertainty and Heterogeneity in
Returns to Education: Evidence from
Finland
Otto Ka¨ssi
University of Helsinki, HECER
December 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43503/
MPRA Paper No. 43503, posted 31 December 2012 14:31 UTC
Uncertainty and Heterogeneity in Returns to
Education: Evidence from Finland∗
Otto Kässi†
December 2012
Abstract
This paper studies the causal effect of education on income uncertainty using a
broad measure of income which encompasses unemployment risk. To accomplish
this, the variance of residuals from a Mincer-type income regression is decomposed
into unobserved heterogeneity (known to the individual when making their edu-
cational choices) and uncertainty (unknown to the individual). The estimation is
done using Finnish registry data. The marginal effect of having a secondary or a
lower tertiary level education decreases income uncertainty. University level edu-
cation is found to have a small positive marginal effect on income uncertainty. The
effect of education on income uncertainty is roughly similar for men in comparison
to women, but income uncertainty is larger for men than for women regardless
of education. Contrary to some results from the U.S., the role of unobserved
heterogeneity is found to be very small.
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1 Introduction
Return to education is perhaps the most widely researched causal relationship in con-
temporary economic literature. A central message from this literature is that measuring
the monetary return to education is complicated by endogenous selection. Endogenous
selection rises simply from the fact that people who choose in different levels of educa-
tion levels are likely to differ from one another in some dimensions unobservable to the
researcher. Neglecting this unobserved heterogeneity may potentially introduce a large
bias.
Monetary uncertainty in return to education has recieved a much smaller empirical
attention. Since the returns to education are not constant and materialize possibly
several years after the choice of education has been made, educational investment has an
inherent uncertainty to it. As when estimating mean returns to education, endogenous
selection also complicates the estimation of uncertainty of returns to education. For
example, a direct comparison of income variances between university and high school
educated people might give an incorrect picture of the effect of education on the income
variance, because we cannot observe counterfactual income streams of the same people
with different education levels. Consequently, the observed variance of income may not
be a good measure of uncertainty, because it is comprised of two distinct components:
unobserved heterogeneity and uncertainty. The intuition for this dichotomy follows from
private information: wage uncertainty, or risk, is the part of the wage variance, which is
not foreseeable by the decision-maker. Unobserved heterogeneity (due to, for example,
individual ability, motivation and general taste for education), on the other hand, is the
portion of the wage variance which is known to – and acted on by – the individual, but
not observed by the researcher. The unobserved heterogeneity is intimately related to
the private information on potential returns to education possessed by the individuals.
For example, if a person knows that her personal return to a completed education is
higher than the population mean return to the same education, she will most likely
choose that education. Disentangling this private information from true uncertainty
from the point of view of the agent making the schooling decision is instrumental when
studying income uncertainty.
The question of how education affects income uncertainty is also of policy relevance.
If, for example, more educated agents face larger income uncertainty, risk-averse agents
might choose less education than would be socially optimal. This would suggest that
income transfers to well educated are socially beneficial. In addition, if the earnings
differences within an education group can be explained by unobserved heterogeneity
rather than uncertainty, there might be less room for insurance against uncertainty.
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This paper studies two interrelated decompositions. First, I correct for self-selection
by modeling the selection of education level. Second, I decompose the uncertainty of
income into a permanent component, which reflects fixed characteristics of individuals
and a transitory component which reflects idiosyncratic shocks to income streams of
individuals. The transitory component is allowed to vary by time and by education
level.
I build on Chen (2008) who extends the framework of Roy (1951) into more than two
sectors and applies it to disentangle uncertainty and unobserved heterogeneity from one
another, while taking into account the fact that the selection of agents to educational
categories may be endogenous. Chen estimates her model using data on U.S. males.
She finds that the uncertainty-education profile is U-shaped where the most and least
educated individuals face the highest income uncertainty. In addition, according to
her model, unobserved heterogeneity is estimated to be up to 20 percent of the total
earnings uncertainty.
The dependent variable in Chen’s paper is the average hourly wage. Her approach
shuts down perhaps the most important source of earnings uncertainty, namely the risk
of unemployment. Instead of hourly wages, this paper studies yearly total taxable in-
come, which, in addition to income from employment, includes unemployment benefits
and other taxable transfers. This measure arguably gives a more complete picture of
the income risks related to a level of education. This is particularly relevant because
international evidence suggests that the difference in unemployment risks between edu-
cation groups may be substantial (Guiso et al. , 2002) and has widened in recent decades
(Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). Using total taxable income as the measure of income also
mitigates the problem of endogenous selection into employment, as people are observed
even if they are not working. The model is estimated using Finnish data. An attractive
feature of the Finnish tax code for the purposes of this paper is that virtually all of
the income transfers, including unemployment benefits, are taxable and are therefore
observed.
I also depart from Chen’s approach in another way. Namely, I estimate separate
models for men and women. In most comparable studies attention is limited to men,
because female workforce participation in most countries has been much lower until
recent years. Nonetheless, the female workforce participation in Finland has been very
high already since the 1990s, which warrants doing a similar analysis for also for females.
Furthermore, since both female education and female workforce participation has also
increased internationally, I find that calculating comparable measures for males and
females is also interesting in its own right from an internatinal perspective. In addition,
I am able to test whether there are differences in the amount of uncertainty in career
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paths between men and women.
To ensure that the schooling and income equations are jointly identified, an appro-
priate instrument, which affects schooling equation but does not appear in the income
equation, is applied. I use local differences in supply of education proxied by the region
of residence in youth as an instrument. Even though I am able to control for a wealth
of family background and individual characteristics, endogeneity of the instrument can
not be ruled out. It turns out, that even the analysis using a possibly endogenous
instrument is informative.
The current paper nests two prominent research themes. First, it explicitly allows
for heterogeneity in the return to education. In this sense, it is closely related to models
used to study heterogeneous returns to schooling (e.g. Aakvik et al. 2010 and Abadie
et al. 2002). In addition, the approach chosen here is related to Cunha & Heckman
(2008), Cunha et al. (2005) and Cunha & Heckman (2007), all of which study how
the private information of individuals is related to their choice of education, but do not
discriminate between permanent and transitory components. The approach of Chen
(2008) is also applied in Mazza & van Ophem (2010) and Mazza et al. (2011)1.
As a preview of the results, I find that income uncertainty decreases up to the
tertiary level of education. University educated individuals face slightly larger earnings
uncertainty compared to people tertiary level education. For men, however, this effect
is not distinguishable from zero. In addition, men face higher income uncertainty
compared to women regardless of education level. Moreover, the estimates for the role
of unobserved heterogeneity are found to be very small compared to estimates from the
U.S.
Rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents details of the Finnish
schooling system. Section 3 introduces the empirical model. Section 4 presents the
data used. Section 5 presents the first and second stage estimates. In addition, Section
5 studies the robustness of the results to relaxing of parametric assumptions. I present
the uncertainty estimates, compare them to the results acquired using data from the
U.S. and discuss how possible endogeneity of the instrument affects the interpretation
of the results in In Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
1Mazza et al. (2011) attempts to replicate the results in Chen (2008) using the same data, but they
get very different results. In particular, their estimates for the unobserved heterogeneity are almost
indistinguishable from zero regardless of education level.
4
2 Brief description of the education system in Finland
The Finnish system of education consists of three stages. Fist stage is the compulsory
education (9 years), which gives eligibility to apply for an upper secondary education.
The upper secondary education (3 years) is provided by upper secondary or vocational
secondary schools. After completing upper secondary education, people apply to ter-
tiary education (3-5 years), which is offered in universities (master level) and polytechnic
colleges (lower tertiary level).
There are two stages of selection. First one takes place after comprehensive school
when students are about 16 years old. Students have an opportunity to apply to an
academically oriented upper secondary school or to a more practically oriented voca-
tional school. The second stage of selection takes place when people apply to tertiary
education. In addition to upper secondary school graduates, also vocational school
graduates are allowed to apply to tertiary education.
Tertiary education is offered in universities and polytechnic colleges. The focus
of universities is research whereas polytechnic colleges are more practically oriented.
Graduates from polytechnics are able to apply to universities to continue their studies.
There are no tuition fees at any level. In addition, a student benefit of roughly EUR
400 is offered to students over 18 not living with their parents.
I use a categorical educational variable, Si, with four distinct categories to capture
the salient features of the Finnish education system. For each individual i, I observe a
categorical schooling variable, si, which is categorized as:
• Si = 1; compulsory education,
• Si = 2; upper secondary education,
• Si = 3; lower tertiary education,
• Si = 4; university level education.
As the data does not allow me to identify dropouts, I classify people according to their
highest completed level of education.
3 Empirical model
3.1 Model for potential incomes
This section introduces the empirical model used in this paper. The setup is adopted
from Chen (2008). It is an extension of the classic Roy (1951) model into more than
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two occupations.
The stylized model consists of two period. In the first period, individuals choose
their levels of education according to their taste. In the second period, they face a
yearly income stream which depends on the level of education they have chosen and
gets an income stream which depends on personal characteristics (both observed and
unobserved), their education and time- and education- specific transitory shocks. We
observe a panel of N workers observed over T years. In the first observation year
each worker has already chosen and completed their preferred level of ecuation. The
potential log-income of each person is given by
yits = yitI (Si = 1) + yitI (Si = 2) + yitI (Si = 3) + yitI (Si = 4) , (1)
where I (·) is an indicator function having value 1 if Si = s (s = 1, 2, 3, 4) and 0
otherwise. The potential wage formulated in (1) gives rise to an income regression
equation of the form:
ysit = αs + xitβ + σsesi + ψstεit, ∀ Si = s. (2)
In (2) αs is the mean earnings for a schooling level and xit is a vector of observables.
The error term consists of two parts. Time invariant fixed effects are incorporated
in σses. These are allowed to be correlated with the observed characteristics and the
choice of education of individuals. ψstεit denotes transitory shocks, which are assumed
to be uncorrelated with both the observable characteristics and the fixed effect. The
potential wage variance within a schooling level in year t is therefore σ2s +ψ2st. Variation
in σ2s is the variance of individual specific fixed effects that are constant in time but
may vary across schooling levels. ψ2stεit, on the other hand, may vary with both time
and schooling level.
It is assumed, that each individual chooses their level of education according to their
preferences. This is formalized by a standard latent index model
S∗i = ziθ + vi, (3)
where S∗i represents the optimal level of schooling chosen by individual i. The latent
schooling factor vi is a N(0, 1) random variable. It summarizes the private information
such as taste for education, unobservable ability and income expectations, which are
known to the individual but unobservable to the researcher2. zi contains the elements
in vector xi and an instrument, which is assumed only to affect level of education but
not income.
2In particular, vi is assumed to capture both pecuniary and non-pecuniary utility components.
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The predicted schooling level Si depends on S∗i by
Si = 1 if −∞ < ziθ + vi ≤ κ1,
...
Si = 4 if κ4 ≥ ziθ + vi >∞.
(4)
The cutoff value, as = κs − ziθ, is the minimal level of the unobserved schooling factor
for which individuals choose s.
The model has three unobservable elements, esi, εit and vi. They are assumed to be
jointly normal with the structure esiεit
vi
 ∼ N
 00
0
 ,
 1 0 ρs0 1 0
ρs 0 1
 , (5)
where ρs ∈ [−1, 1] . Intuitively (5) implies that the unobservables in the schooling
equation may be correlated with permanent earnings differences, but they are assumed
to be uncorrelated with the transitory shocks. Therefore, the possible selection bias
only affects the estimate permanent component but not the transitory component. The
transitory component captures macroeconomic shocks and and institutional changes
which affect all individuals symmetrically and are therefore uncorrelated with vi.
The correlation between the fixed effect and the unobserved schooling factor ρ has a
central role in the model: it captures the selection effect. If ρs > 0, the unobservables in
schooling and earnings equations are positively correlated, the selection effect is positive
and workers with high income potential get more education and if ρs < 0, people with
high income potential tend to enter labor markets at a younger age. Consequently ρs
also governs the magnitude and the direction of the bias in the OLS estimates: if ρs > 0,
OLS overstates the true return to education and if ρs < 0, OLS understates the true
return to education.3
From the point of view of an individual making her schooling decision, the expected
log-income is given by
E [ysit | si = s, xit, vi] = αs + xitβ + σsρsvi, (6)
where the term σsρsvi represents the channel through which individual schooling factors
affect the potential wage.
3Cameron & Heckman (1998) discuss, which types of economic models would rationalize the ordered
structure given by Equations (3), (4) and (5). Most importantly, they conclude that vi has to be
independent of the level of schooling, i.e. vsi = vi ∀ s.
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Since agents are assumed to know their own draw of vi, a proper measure of income
uncertainty should account for vi. The unforeseeable component of log-income, or in-
come uncertainty from the point of view of an individual, is measured by the deviation
of realized income from its mean conditional on unobservable vi and observables xit and
Si,
τ 2st = V ar [σsesi + ψstεei | xit, Si = s, vi]
= σ2s
(
1− ρ2s
)
+ ψ2st. (7)
Equation (7) can be rearranged to σ2s + ψ2st = σ2sρ2s + τ 2st. It shows that the residual
variance of equation (2) consists of two parts: unobserved heterogeneity (σ2sρ2s) and
uncertainty (τ 2st). Income uncertainty is governed by the permanent and transitory
components (σs and ψst) and the correlation between the unobserved schooling factor
and permanent component ρs.
3.2 Identification of variance components
Equations (6) and (7) are not directly applicable for regression analysis because vi is
unobservable. To account for the effect of unobserved vi, a multi-choice version of
Heckman selection correction model (Heckman, 1979) is used.
As a first stage, a latent index model (3) is estimated using ordered probit. The
model is used to calculate generalized residuals of the schooling model4,
λsi =
φ (κs − ziθ)− φ (κs+1 − ziθ)
Φ (κs+1 − ziθ)− Φ (κs − ziθ) ,
where φ (·) is the probability density function of a standard normal distribution and
Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Adding
λsi as a regressor to (6) accounts for the correlation between unobserved schooling factor
and education level. The expected value of observed wages from the point of view of
the researcher can now be written as
E [ysit | si = s, xit, vi] = αs + xitβ + σsρsλi. (8)
Calculating the difference of realized and expected wages gives
ysit − E [ysit | si = s, xit, vi] = σs − σsρs + ψst, (9)
4In the case of a binary schooling variable, the generalized residuals would boil down to Inverse
Mills’ ratios.
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Variance of (9) equals the measure of uncertainty, τ 2st. Additionally, (9) implies that
whenever ρs 6= 0, selection leads to a truncation of the observed income variance which,
in turn, leads to an understatement of income uncertainty compared to the case we
would observe if the education was randomly assigned to individuals. The degree of
understatement is given by 5:
δsi = λ
2
si −
(κs − ziθ)φ (κs − ziθ)− (κs+1 − ziθ)φ (κs+1 − ziθ)
Φ (κs+1 − ziθ)− Φ (κs − ziθ) .
In Equation (7), σ2s captures time-invariant individual heterogeneity in gains from
education. σ2sρ2s is a measure of selection on gains; it is the correlation between the indi-
vidual specific gain on education and the selection into education. The third term, ψ2st,
captures transitory shocks which are assumed to be independent of other components
of variance.
The variance of transitory component can be identified from the residuals of the
within-individual model,
(yit − y¯i) = (xit − x¯i) β −
(
ξsit − ξ¯si
)
, (10)
where bars denote time averages of the corresponding variables. Time-invariant individ-
ual regressors, including λsi, are subsumed in the fixed effects. Therefore, the variance
of the residuals of (10) gives an estimate for the transitory component of income, or
ψˆ2st = V ar
(
ξˆsit − ξ¯si
)
.
The regression coefficients αˆs,βˆ and ˆρsσs = γˆs can be identified using a between-
individuals model
y¯i = αs + x¯iβ + γsλ¯si + ωi. (11)
The error term in (11) is, by equation (9),
ωi = σsesi + ξ¯si − γsλsi,
and its variance is
V ar [ωi | Si = s] = σ2s − γ2sδsi + ψ2st
Solving this for σ2s gives the estimator for time invariant individual specific variance of
wages for each schooling level,
5λi and δi are derived in Maddala (1987) under the assumption of joint normality.
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σˆ2s = V̂ ar [ωi | Si = s] + γˆ2s ¯ˆδs − ψˆ2st, (12)
where, again, bars denote averages over individuals. The second term γˆ2s
¯ˆ
sδ in equation
(12) is needed to correct for the truncation of variances due to self selection. Each term
in term in equation (7) is now identified:
τˆ 2s = σˆ
2
s − γˆ2s + ψˆ2s
4 Data
Data used in this paper is a random sample of 46321 individuals from Finnish Census.
I limit my attention to working males and females aged between 28 and 43. I assume
that by the age of 28, people have finished their education. An educational category
of an individual is defined as the education they have at the youngest age they are
observed in the panel. It is possible that individuals educate themselves further after
the age of 28, but as my main interest is, how well individuals are able to predict their
income in their youth, I interpret individuals’ decision to re-educate themselves at later
ages as a realized uncertainty, which should not be controlled for.
The panel spans 1994-2009, adding up to a total of 244637 individual-year obser-
vations for men and 213840 for women. Composition of the sample is summarized in
Table 1. The panel is constructed in a way that even the youngest cohort is observed
for six years. I limited my attention to individuals who were born after 1966 to make
sure that an educational reform which took place in Finland in the early 1970’s does
not differently affect the cohorts under study.6
The educational categories are defined according to standard Finnish classification
of education. I do not discriminate between fields of education but only levels. The
goal of this paper is to study the returns of an attained degree rather than returns to
years of education. The specification used allows the marginal return to schooling to
vary according to the level of schooling completed. Using the highest degree attained
also mitigates the effect of measurement errors, since years of education are usually
inputed using average years of education needed to complete a degree, which introduces
measurement error.
6The goal of this reform was to standardize the quality of comprehensive education within the
country. Consequently, people born before 1966 faced a different school system from those born after
1966. In particular, before the reform, the quality of comprehensive education varied a great deal
between regions. In addition, the reform resulted in removal of one educational tracking stage. For
details about the reform, see e.g., Pekkarinen et al. (2009).
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As already mentioned, the risk of unemployment constitutes a considerable part of
the total income uncertainty. Choice of the outcome variable reflects this; the dependent
variable in income regressions is the log of total yearly taxable income which, in addition
to wages, includes taxable income transfers. As a result, the observed income streams
allow for potential spells of unemployment. However, if a person drops out of the
workforce entirely, she does not contribute to the estimation.
The income concept may introduce a problem of its own, since unemployment may
be voluntary or involuntary. To separate these from one another, solely observations
where the main type of activity of an individual is either working or unemployed are
included in the estimation7. The approach chosen leaves some observations with zero
income. I drop these observations. This does not affect the main results, because the
proportion of zero-observations is very small (less than 2% of observations)8. To ensure
comparability between years, the measure of income is deflated to EUR 2009 using the
Consumer Price Index.
Vector of controls in Equation (2) includes the paternal and maternal education
classified using the same four-level classification which is used for individuals’ own
education, a measure for family income calculated as the sum the income of mother and
income of father and nine dummies for family socioeconomic status. Family background
characteristics are measured at age 14 if possible. In addition, controls for first language,
nationality and the region of residence in adulthood are included.
Estimation of Equation (11) necessitates an instrument excluded from the income
equation (2). The region of residence in youth is used as an instrument.910 The as-
sumption is that the region of residence is correlated with individuals’ access to higher
education but not their income. In addition, I exclude individuals who have no infor-
mation on their place of residence at youth. The estimation results provided in Section
4.1 support the notion that the instrument is relevant.
As discussed by Card (1993), the place of residence in youth may affect income
because of differences in local supply of education, but also because family background is
correlated with their place of residence. For this reason family background variables are
7The main type of activity is defined as the activity of an individual during a single week of each
year. In general, for an individual to be classified as unemployed (and be eligible for unemployment
benefits), she must agree to accept a job if offered one.
8None of the results qualitatively change whether I exclude them or inpute a small positive income
value for these observations.
9Childhood information is collected from censuses. Censuses were administered in 1970, 1975, 1980,
1985 and yearly from 1988 onwards.
10A similar instrument is used, among others, by Suhonen et al. (2010) for Finland, Card (1993)
for the U.S. and Bedi & Gaston (1999) for Honduras.
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controlled for. In addition, Card points out that differences in comprehensive schooling
resources may affect subsequent income. In the case of Finland, the comprehensive
education is arranged in public schools with very small differences in resources and
quality (Kirjavainen, 2009). In addition, international evidence suggests that the impact
of school quality on learning (Kramarz et al. , 2009) and income (Betts, 1995) is rather
small even in the context of less standardized comprehensive schooling. Finally, to
control for differences in local labor market conditions in the presence of imperfect
labor mobility, I control for job location in adulthood in the income equation. Despite
controlling for family background and job location characteristics, it might still be the
case that the instrument is correlated with the outcome. If this is the case, the estimates
for ρ overestimate the true parameter value. I discuss this possibility in Section 6.
Figure 1 plots the estimated averages and standard deviations of log incomes for
each panel year calculated from the sample described in Table 2. It is apparent that the
mean income rises with education. Differences in the standard deviations of incomes
are quantitavely much smaller, but some aspects can already be noted. First, people
with only a compulsory education have the largest standard deviations of incomes.
The standard deviation of male income in the lowest education category is especially
large. The relative contribution of heterogeneity, permanent differences and transitory
differences remains unclear. Using the method outlined in the previous section, it is
possible to disentangle them from one another
Control variables, which capture the observed heterogeneity, are summarized in
Table 2. Not surprisingly, the distribution of family background variables is virtually
identical between sexes. There are larger differences in the distribution of education
levels. The proportion of men with a basic or upper secondary education is larger than
women. Conversely, there are more women with at least a tertiary level education.11
5 First and second stage estimates
5.1 First stage: schooling choice
Equation (3) is estimated by ordered probit. The estimated model includes family
background measures and the instrument for education. Table 3 reports the test
11The fact that women have overtaken men in terms of their education is a common finding in most
industrialized countries (Barro & Lee, 2010).
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Figure 1: Means (left panel) and variances (right panel) of yearly incomes by year for
men and women.
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Table 1: Sample sizes used in estimation.
Year of birth Sample size (men) Sample size (women) Year-obs. (men) Year-obs. (women) Years
1966 2742 2543 38576 33335 1994-2009
1967 2696 2510 35330 30382 1995-2009
1968 2530 2501 31253 28601 1996-2009
1969 2318 2213 26752 23623 1997-2009
1970 2417 2211 25729 21475 1998-2009
1971 2118 2155 20589 19216 1999-2009
1972 2134 2056 18905 16643 2000-2009
1973 2100 1928 16462 13915 2001-2009
1974 2226 2146 15612 13739 2002-2009
1975 2492 2285 15429 12911 2003-2009
Total 23773 22548 244637 213840
statistics for the relevance of the instruments. There are no rule-of-thumb test statistic
values for the relevance of instruments maximum likelihood models. The relevance of
instrument using linear education as the dependent variable is also reported for this
reason. Educational categories are converted to years of education using average times-
to-degree measured in full years.12 This introduces noise to the dependent variable.
Consequently the F-statistics reported in Table 3 might represent a lower bound for
the effect of the instruments on education. Nonetheless, even the F-statistics of the
linear model suggest that the instruments are highly relevant.
5.2 Second stage: average returns to schooling
This section presents estimates for the average returns to education. The reported
estimates are based on the between model (11), where average yearly income of an
individual is regressed on individual characteristics, schooling variable, mean age, mean
age squared and λsi.
To account for the fact that λsi is a generated regressor, the standard errors are cal-
culated using a block bootstrap procedure, where 100 samples of size N are drawn with
replacement from the original population. For each bootstrap draw k, the estimates
αˆks ,βˆk and γˆks are calculated. Expected values and standard errors of the parameters
are calculated from the distribution of these bootstrap draws. The parameter estimates
and their standard errors are presented in the second column of Table 4. The effect
of education on income is nonlinear with respect to level of education. Most educated
individuals accrue the highest marginal returns.
To facilitate comparability to literature, also IV estimates for the average return
to education are reported in the third column of Table 4. They are reported for
reference, but are not used when estimating uncertainty parameters. The IV estimates
12These are 9 years for the compulsory level, 12 years for the upper secondary level, 15 for the lower
tertiary education and 17 for the master level education.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables.
Men Women Men Women
Time invariant variables Family background
Education Father’s education
Compulsory education 0.18 0.15 Compulsory education 0.53 0.53
(0.38) (0.36) (0.5) (0.5)
Upper secondary 0.52 0.45 Upper secondary 0.25 0.25
(0.50) (0.5) (0.43) (0.43)
Lowest tertiary 0.21 0.25 Lower tertiary 0.15 0.15
(0.41) (0.43) (0.36) (0.36)
Bachelor or more 0.09 0.16 University 0.06 0.06
(0.29) (0.37) (0.24) (0.24)
First language Mother’s education
Finnish 0.950 0.951 Compulsory education 0.52 0.52
(0.218) (0.216) (0.48) (0.5)
Swedish 0.048 0.048 Upper secondary 0.31 0.31
(0.215) (0.214) (0.46) (0.46)
Other 0.002 0.001 Lowest tertiary 0.15 0.15
(0.040) (0.032) (0.36) (0.36)
Nationality Bachelor or more 0.03 0.03
Finnish 0.998 0.999 (0.17) (0.17)
(0.042) (0.032)
Other 0.002 0.001 Family income (in 100 EUR 2009) 394.23 393.401
(0.042) (0.032) (253.06) (253.01)
Instrument for education Average ages in years
Region residence in youth 1994 28 28
Uusimaa 0.20 0.21 1997 30 30
(0.40) (0.41) 2000 31 31
Varsinais-Suomi 0.08 0.08 2003 33 33
(0.27) (0.27) 2006 36 36
Satakunta 0.05 0.05 2009 39 39
(0.22) (0.22)
Kanta-Häme 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.17)
Pirkanmaa 0.08 0.08
(0.27) (0.27)
Päijät-Häme 0.04 0.04
(0.2) (0.2)
Kymenlaakso 0.04 0.04
(0.2) (0.2)
Etelä-Karjala 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.17)
Etelä-Savo 0.03 0.04
(0.17) (0.2)
Pohjois-Savo 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Pohjois-Karjala 0.03 0.04
(0.17) (0.2)
Keski-Suomi 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Etelä-Pohjanmaa 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Pohjanmaa 0.04 0.03
(0.2) (0.17)
Keski-Pohjanmaa 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14)
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 0.08 0.07
(0.27) (0.26)
Kainuu 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14)
Lappi 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Itä-Uusimaa 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Calculations are based on a random sample of individuals who are born between 1966–1975
and are between 28 and 43 years old. N is the sample size of time-invariant variables. Year-observations report the average number of
years an individual is observed in the data.
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Table 3: Test statistics for relevance of instrument.
Men Women
Dependent variable: categorical education Likelihood ratio statistic 334.66 417.06
Ordered probit [0.00] [0.00]
Dependent variable: education in years F-statistic 17.06 22.74
Linear model [0.00] [0.00]
Notes: P-values in brackets. Instrument for education is the region of residence in youth. Both models include controls for parents’
education, family income, nationality, first language and year of birth.
are somewhat larger than the estimates based on the selection model. Without a
selectivity correction, a positive correlation between schooling of individuals and the
residual in the income equation would result in an upward bias in the estimated returns
to income. This bias arises if some of the unobservable characteristics (i.e. a high
draw of σs) were positively correlated with the schooling choice of an individual. This
happens for example, if the people with high income potential are also those who self-
select into higher education (Griliches, 1977). In the context of the current model, the
correlation between income potential and schooling presents itself in positive values of
the correction term γs. There is limited evidence of this: for men the estimate of the
correction terms for lowest education categories γ1 and γ2 and for the correction term
of the highest education category γ4 of women are statistically significantly positive
conventional significance levels. The correction terms for other levels of schooling are
not statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Even the correction
terms that differ statistically significantly from zero are qualitatively rather small.
Since σs > 0 for all schooling levels and both genders, and the error structure
given in equation (5) implies that γs = ρsσs, it follows that my estimate of ρˆ is very
small. This finding suggests that individuals have very little private information on
their comparative advantage, or, alternatively, individuals do not act on their private
information on potential income, and therefore the unobserved heterogeneity is very
small.
A possible concern for the validity of the results of this paper is that they hinge
on the assumption of joint normality of error terms and the linear dependence between
mean incomes and the selection term.
To shed some light on the validity of the results, I have performed the test described
in Vella (1998, pp. 137-138) and estimated Equation (11) where in addition to the
Inverse Mills’ Ratio, second and third degree polynomials of the Inverse Mills’ Ratios
are used as regressors. This allows me to test for possible deviations from joint normality
of unobservables in schooling and income equations. The tests for the joint significance
of the higher order polynomial always fail to reject the null hypothesis of linearity. This
speaks in favor of the parametric assumptions.
Confidence on the distributional assumptions is further strengthened by the fact
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that the estimates of |ρˆ| < 1 and δˆsi ∈ [0, 1] for all individuals, which is consistent with
normality (notice that no a priori restrictions on ρˆ and δˆ are placed). Nonetheless, even
though the assumption of normality is not immediately rejected, some caution should
be exercised when interpreting the results, since they are obviously conditional on the
distributional assumptions.
Table 4: Second stage estimates.
Men Education categories Years of education
Education OLS Corrected for selection OLS IV
Upper secondary educ. 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Lower tertiary educ 0.47*** 0.45***
(0.01) (0.04)
University 0.74*** 0.73***
(0.01) (0.07)
Selection correction term
Compulsory education 0.03**
(0.01)
Upper secondary 0.02*
(0.01)
Lower tertiary 0.01
(0.02)
Bachelor or more 0.01
(0.03)
Women Education categories Years of education
Education OLS Corrected for selection OLS IV
Upper secondary educ. 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Lower tertiary educ 0.37*** 0.38***
(0.01) (0.06)
University 0.77*** 0.72***
(0.01) (0.07)
Selection correction term
Compulsory education -0.01
(0.02)
Upper secondary 0.00
(0.01)
Lowest tertiary 0.00
(0.01)
Bachelor or more 0.04*
(0.02)
Notes: Estimates are based on a between-individuals model. Standard errors in parenthesis. For the OLS and IV models, standard errors
are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent OLS covariance matrix. For the selection corrected model standard
errors are based on 100 bootstrap replications. In addition to variables reported, both models include controls for parents’ education,
family income, nationality, first language and year of birth, age and age squared. In columns 1 and 2, the education is measured as a
categorical education variable. In columns 3 and 4, the education categories are transformed into years of education using the typical
time-to-education measures.
6 Uncertainty estimates
6.1 Main estimates
The estimates for the permanent and transitory components of income uncertainty at
each education level are reported in this section. Standard errors of each variance com-
ponent are again calculated from 100 bootstrap resamples. The uncertainty estimates
are reported in Table 5. Since the error structure assumed implies that unobserved
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heterogeneity is not correlated with the transitory shocks, the total wage uncertainty is
a sum of two components: transitory shocks and permanent earnings variance purged
from the effect of private information.
I first discuss the transitory variance estimates. Since transitory shocks are time-
varying, I start by reporting the time-means of the transitory component (denoted by
ψ¯s). Among men, individuals in the lowest education group face the highest transitory
income shocks. People with at least a secondary level education face similar transitory
income shocks regardless of education. The finding is different for women: transitory
shock variances are almost constant among the three lowest education categories. The
variance of transitory shocks are somewhat higher among the group with the highest
education compared to other groups, even though the difference is qualitatively small.
The differences between the transitory shocks of men and women are otherwise rather
small, but men with the basic level education face the highest transitory income shocks.
The time-profile of the variance of transitory shocks can be seen from Figure 2; they
are rather similar between education groups and sexes, which supports the idea that
transitory income shocks are mostly driven by macroeconomic conditions.
Turning to permanent income variance, I find that education decreases permanent
income differences considerably for men; having an upper secondary degree decreases
permanent income uncertainty by 23%. Permanent income uncertainty decreases by
another 15% with a tertiary level education. The difference between lower tertiary
and university level education are statistically insignificant. In total, the permanent
inequality is over 35% larger for the lowest education category in comparison to highest
education category. The effect of education on permanent income variance is of similar
magnitude for women and men. Having a secondary level education decreases perma-
nent income variance by 30%. The uncertainty decreases further with a tertiary level
education, but the differences between lower tertiary and university education is indis-
tinguishable from zero for men and small and positive for women. Despite the marginal
effects being similar, the level of permanent uncertainty is considerably larger for men
than women regardless of the level of education. The differences in permanent incomes
are twice as large for men than for women in the two highest education categories.
Transitory and total income inequality levels are plotted in Figure 3.
To give a better grasp of the effects of education on average return and uncertainty,
Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of completed education on average income and
income uncertainty. Completing a secondary education decreases income uncertainty
of men more than that of women. A tertiary level education has a small negative effect
on male and female earnings uncertainty. Completing an university level education
increases uncertainty somewhat; this effect is, however, statistically significant for men
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but not for women. The returns-to-degree estimates are similar among men and women
on all levels of education.
Table 5: Estimates of income variance components.
Men
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Marginal effects -0.02*** -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Permanent component 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Marginal effects -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.00
(0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Total wage uncertainty 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.18
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Marginal effects -0.06*** -0.02*** 0.01
(0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Women
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Marginal effect -0.002 -0.002* 0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Marginal effect -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01
(0.005) (0.003) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Total wage uncertainty 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.13
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Marginal effect -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01
(0.004) (0.003) (0.05)
Notes: Estimates based on region of residence in youth instrument. Standard errors from 100 bootstrap resamples in parenthesis.
Education categories are: 1. compulsory education; 2. upper secondary education; 3. lowest tertiary education; 4. bachelor level
education or higher.
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Figure 2: Transitory shock variances year by year.
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Figure 3: Transitory (dashed lines) and total income variances (solid lines) for men
and women by education categories. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals
calculated by bootstrap.
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Figure 4: Marginal effects of completing a degree on mean income (horizontal axis)
and uncertainty (vertical axis) for men (black symbols) and women (grey symbols).
The dashed lines represent the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals of return and
uncertainty estimates on the corresponding axes.
6.2 Comparison to U.S. studies
My risk estimates differ from those obtained in Chen (2008). Completing an education is
found to decrease income risks at lower education levels, but the effect is close to zero or
even marginally positive for university graduates, whereas Chen’s results suggest an U-
shaped profile of income risks with most and least educated individuals the highest, and
more or less similar, income risks. Chen conjectures that the high income uncertainty of
university graduates is related to the fact that they are able to choose their occupation
from a wider pool of potential occupations, which is also reflected in their permanent
income differences. It is possible that also Finnish university graduates are able to
choose their occupation from a wider pool, but their income uncertainty is still smaller
than that of lower educated individuals. It seems plausible that this is due to smaller
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unemployment risks of more educated individuals face smaller unemployment risks.
A considerably more surprising finding is the very small unobserved heterogeneity.
This is in stark contrast to the estimates based on data from the U.S.13 For example,
Cunha & Heckman (2007) conclude that up to 50% of the ex post variance in income
of college graduates is attributable to unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. is forecastable
by individuals making their choice on whether or not to attend college. The main
explanation for the results is the choice of measure of income. The studies based on U.S.
data use either a long period average earnings (Cunha & Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha
et al. , 2005), or average hourly wage (Chen, 2008), which both arguably contain less
variation than the yearly total income. Therefore, the correlation between the residuals
in schooling and income equations, which is used to identify unobserved heterogeneity,
is almost mechanically smaller in absolute value.
A second partial explanation is that I target people in their youth. As the nine-year
comprehensive school is mandatory, it may indeed be the case that young people mak-
ing their choice on whether or not to attend higher education have limited information
on their future incomes at the age of fifteen. In addition, the earnings may be more
volatile in the beginning of peoples’ career. Furthermore, since the Finnish comprehen-
sive education is extremely standardized and allows for little differentiation in school
curricula between skill groups, it may convey less private information to students about
their future incomes and, therefore lead to a smaller unobserved heterogeneity, than a
less standardized system would.
However, even though the unobserved heterogeneity is found to be smaller than in
the U.S., this does not imply that people would have less information on their potential
future income streams. Rather, it seems plausible, that, given the high amoung of
redistribution and collective bargaining in Finnish labor market, people would have
a rather good perception on their potential future income, but this perception is not
correlated with individual characteristics that are unknown to the researcher.
6.3 Sensitivity of results to the instrument
Even though I control for a wide variety of background characteristics in both first and
second stages, the validity of the instrument is somewhat questionable. It is possible
that the instrument has a direct effect on income even after controlling for X. However,
this endogeneity would bias the estimate of ρs upwards in absolute value. Therefore,
13In a scientific replication study, Mazza et al. (2011) finds non-zero estimates for unobserved
heterogeneity using German and British data. In addition, their estimates for unobserved heterogeneity
using U.S. are almost indistinguishable from zero.
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it is plausible that my estimates for ρˆs represent an upper limit of the true parameter
value.14
To study to what extend the possible endogeneity of instrument drives the results, I
have estimated the model without an exclusion restriction. The estimation results are
presented in tables 6 and 7. The results are very similar to those reported in Tables
4 and 5. Since the two alternative specifications give very similar, and quantitatively
small, estimates for the unobserved heterogeneity and, if anything, the main estimates
are biased upwards in absolute value, it seems clear that unobserved heterogeneity is,
indeed, very small.
I have also estimated the model using parental education as an instrument for own
education. This instrument is very likely endogenous, because parental education has
quite reliably been shown to have a causal effect on individuals’ own education (Björk-
lund & Jäntti, 2012). The estimation results are very close to the main estimates.
Particularly, the estimates for unobserved heterogeneity are very close to zero.
Table 6: Second stage estimates (estimated without an exclusion restriction).
Men Education categories
Return to education level Corrected for selection Selection correction term
Upper secondary educ. 0.25*** Comprehensive educ 0.00
(0.54) (0.01)
Lower tertiary educ 0.47*** Upper secondary educ. 0.00
(0.05) (0.01)
University 0.73*** Lower tertiary educ 0.00
(0.07) (0.02)
University 0.03*
(0.02)
Women Education categories
Return to education level Corrected for selection Comprehensive educ 0.00
Upper secondary educ. 0.20*** (0.02)
(0.05) Upper secondary educ. 0.00
Lower tertiary educ 0.39*** (0.01)
(0.05) Lower tertiary educ 0.00
University 0.74*** (0.01)
(0.06) University 0.02
(0.02)
Notes: Estimates are based on a model without an instrument. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors are based on 100
bootstrap replications. In addition to variables reported, both models include controls for location of residence, parents’ education and
family income, nationality, first language and year of birth, age and age squared.
7 Conclusions
This paper applies a simple model for identifying potential income distributions. The
model is based on the residuals of the income regression equation. The variance of
14The IV estimates are somewhat larger than previous estimates from Finland (e.g. Uusitalo 1999).
This may be related to the endogeneity of the instrument or, alternatively, to the fact that my measure
of income consists of mean earnings and the unemployment risk. If education increases earnings and
decreases the probability of being unemployed, this would lead to higher mean return to education.
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Table 7: Estimates of income variance components (estimated without an exclusion
restriction).
Men
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
Total wage uncertainty 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.18
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Women
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.05
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Effect of private information on permanent component 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Total wage uncertainty 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.14
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Notes: Estimates based on a model estimated without an instrument. Standard errors from 100 bootstrap resamples in parenthesis.
Education categories are: 1. compulsory education; 2. upper secondary education; 3. lowest tertiary education; 4. bachelor level
education or higher.
residuals is comprised of two components: uncertainty and unobserved heterogeneity.
The uncertainty is further comprised of two components: permanent income differences
and transitory shocks. Using a parametric model for selection, this paper disentangles
the role of unobserved heterogeneity from permanent income differences. This paper
departs from previous studies in two ways: in addition to wages, measure of income
also includes transfers to people who are not working. This gives a possibility to also
include the unemployed in the estimation allowing for a more complete picture of in-
come uncertainty. Second, separate models for men and women are estimated to give
comparable education-uncertainty gradients.
The results indicate that education is a good investment: in addition to having
higher mean income, more educated individuals have smaller permanent income dif-
ferences and face smaller transitory income shocks, even after correcting for selection.
Moreover, my results indicate that men face considerably riskier income processes. For
example, men with a basic level education is about 33% higher than women with a sim-
ilar education. The results show that the higher male income variance is by and large
driven by permanent earnings differences; no differences in unobserved heterogeneity
are found. In addition, transitory shocks affect both genders and almost all education
groups symmetrically. Only men in the lowest education category face larger transitory
earnings shocks.
The estimates on share of unobserved heterogeneity in permanent income differences
are qualitatively very small. This is a stark difference from previous studies, which use
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data from the U.S. and find that the effect of unobserved heterogeneitymay be up to
50% of permanent income differences. I argue that this result is likely driven by the
choice of dependent variable or the relatively young estimation sample. Both of these
factors increase the noise in the dependent variable compared to specifications typically
used in studies using data from the U.S.
Method applied in this paper takes advantage of observed choices made by indi-
viduals to infer their information sets and, consequently, unobserved heterogeneity. A
possible caveat in the analysis, is that if people know their expected incomes, but do
not act on this information, the method which is based on their observed choices nec-
essarily understates the unobserved heterogeneity. This may be a particularly relevant
concern in the case of Finland, where higher education is not privately funded.
Since correcting for selection has only a small effect on the estimates of means and
variances of incomes conditional on education level, it appears that, in the case of
Finland, not correcting for selection has a marginal impact on the estimated returns
to education and uncertainty involved. In addition, the estimates for unobservable
heterogeneity are likely sensitive to the choice of dependent variable.
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